Exchange rate arrangements and misalignments: contrasting words and deeds by Yougbaré, Lassana
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Exchange rate arrangements and
misalignments: contrasting words and
deeds
Lassana Yougbare´
University Ouaga II
10. May 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32362/
MPRA Paper No. 32362, posted 21. July 2011 13:24 UTC
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Misalignments: 
Contrasting Words and Deeds
Lassana Yougbaré1
May 2011
Abstract
 The  paper  studies  the  misalignment2-exchange  rate  regime  linkages  by 
pursing three avenues. First, does misalignment vary across alternative de jure and 
de  facto exchange  rate  systems?  Second,  can  these  misalignment-effects  be 
explained by different probabilities of undervaluation and overvaluation episodes? 
Lastly, does delivering the promised exchange rate regime pay off?
The regression analysis reveals that misalignment is larger in fixed systems, 
with middle income and the CFA countries displaying the largest effect. This result 
likely  stems from more  (less)  frequent  overvaluation  (undervaluation)  episodes. 
Intermediate regimes are found to be associated with a smaller misalignment in 
middle  income  countries  and  a  larger  misalignment  in  low  and  high  income 
countries. But only in the latter does this misalignment-impact appear to result from 
more frequent overvaluation episodes. In the other groups of countries it may  come 
from over and undervaluation episodes with different magnitudes.
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1. Introduction
The real exchange rate plays a prominent role in open economies  (Obstfeld, 
2004). Indeed, real exchange misalignment distorts the intra and inter-country allocation 
of  productive  resources  and hampers  the international  competitiveness  of  domestic 
producers. It may as well be an omen for crisis. Misalignment may also trigger beggar-
thy-neighbor policies. Ultimately, it would hamper economic growth and development.
Economic  theory  stipulates  that  the  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  is 
independent of  the exchange rate system, it  is  solely determined by the economy’s 
fundamentals. However, misalignment, that is deviations of the real exchange rate from 
its equilibrium level, depends on the existing exchange arrangement.
Indeed, the existence of nominal rigidities implies that the real exchange rate 
would  adjust  differently  to  changing  economic  conditions  under  flexible  and  fixed 
exchange regimes. In the former changes in the nominal exchange rate carry out the 
adjustment. In the latter the real exchange rate departs from equilibrium. The resulting 
misalignment  persists  as  long  as  prices  and  wages  adjust  to  restore  equilibrium. 
Supportive evidence is provided by Sarno, Valente and Wohar (2003) in six industrial 
European countries3 and Catao and Solomou (2005) for the gold standard system.
In a fixed regime a devaluation may hasten misalignment correction. However, 
besides not  being always available4 devaluation may prove problematic  because of 
political  costs  (Collins,  1996),  and  uncertainty  about  the  misalignment  extent,  the 
nominal-real exchange rate elasticity, and the nature and scale of the shocks buffeting 
the  economy.  The  correction  of  mild  misalignments  would  thus  likely  be  achieved 
through price changes in fixed regimes and because of  a  sluggish downward price 
adjustment misalignment builds up. In the face of severe misalignment a consensus to 
devalue may ultimately emerge. These patterns of adjustment under fixed regimes were 
corroborated by Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005), Parsley and Popper (2001), 
and Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), the latter focusing only on overvaluation episodes.
The faster  adjustment  under  flexible  regimes also  hinges crucially  on  policy 
credibility. Absent credibility, flexibility may become an additional source of monetary 
instability which impedes the real  exchange rate adjustment (see,  e.g.,  Lothian and 
McCarthy,  2002).  Instead,  a  fixed  regime  would  eliminate  this  domestic  source  of 
instability  but  at  the  expense  of  monetary  policy  autonomy  when  capital  is  highly 
mobile. Moreover, as the failure of several exchange rate based stabilization programs 
illustrates, credibility is also critical to the success of fixed regimes (see,  e.g., Calvo, 
1986; Calvo and Vegh, 1993; Guidotti and Vegh, 1999).
The  exchange  rate  crisis  literature  has  proved  that  those  crises  force  the 
reinstatement  of  an  exchange  rate  parity  which  is  consistent  with  the  economy's 
3 The sample of countries includes Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland.
4 In hard pegs such as currency boards institutional reforms may be required before devaluing the currency or changing the regime altogether.
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fundamentals. In particular, balance sheet effects5 lead to “fear of floating” meaning that 
flexible regime countries are reluctant to let their nominal exchange rate fluctuate freely 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2000 and, Céspedes, Chang and Velasco, 2004). Misalignment 
may thus appear and persist (Dornbusch, 2001; Frankel, 2005).
According to Aizenman and Glick (2005), a fixed system may lock a country in a “trap”  
which ultimately entails a costly exit. Indeed, when confronted with adverse shocks, the 
authorities should either stabilize the nominal exchange rate or stabilize the interest rate 
(Calvo and Mishkin, 2003; Obstfeld, 1996). When a speculative attack finally forces the 
transition to a more flexible regime, the nominal exchange rate sharply depreciates, 
thereby generating real undervaluation. The larger the foreign currency-denominated 
debt the more over-depreciated will the real exchange rate be (Cavallo et al., 2007).
Lastly,  the monetary approach to the equilibrium exchange rate stresses the 
importance of the relative growth of money supply in explaining short term exchange 
rate disequilibrium. For instance, the overshooting model predicts that misalignment will  
appear more often in flexible systems than in fixed ones.
All in all, the theoretical misalignment-effects of the exchange rate system are 
not clear-cut. Furthermore, the empirical research is still somewhat limited and has yet 
to produce conclusive evidence. This debate besides, it is now widely accepted that the 
exchange regime many countries announce may differ substantially from the one they 
actually implement (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). As a consequence, recent effort 
has concentrated on categorizing exchange rate regimes according to what countries 
do rather than what they declare, resulting in the so called de facto classification. This 
article takes advantage of the de facto classification developed by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2003) to supplement the self-declared exchange systems, thus allowing us to contrast 
the misalignment-effects of actual and declared regimes.
More precisely, the paper endeavours to add broader empirical evidence on the 
misalignment-exchange rate regimes linkages by investigating the following questions. 
First, does misalignment vary across alternative de jure and de facto exchange rate 
systems?  Second,  can  these  misalignment-effects  be  explained  by  different 
probabilities of undervaluation and overvaluation episodes? Lastly, do countries that 
deliver the promised regime perform differently than those which do not?
To answer these questions, non stationary panels econometric techniques are 
used, in a first step, to estimate the relationship between the real exchange rate and its 
real and monetary determinants. The estimated relationship is then used to compute 
the equilibrium real exchange rate and derive misalignment indexes. In a second step,  
the misalignment-effects of alternative exchange rate systems are assessed.
5 Balance sheets effects mean that nominal exchange rate fluctuations affect firms' net worth and financing cost because of maturity and exchange  
rate mismatches in their assets and liabilities, especially in emerging markets.
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The  rest  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  The  next  section  defines  and 
measures the equilibrium real exchange rate and misalignment. The third one turns to 
the econometric analysis. Concluding remarks are offered in the last section.
2. Equilibrium real exchange rate and misalignment: definition and measurement
2.1. Definition and concepts of equilibrium real exchange rate
This paper adopts Edwards' (1989a) definition of the equilibrium real exchange 
rate  as  "the  relative  price  of  tradables  to  nontradables  that,  for  given  sustainable  
(equilibrium) values of other relevant variables such as taxes, international prices and  
technology, results in the simultaneous attainment of internal and external equilibrium”.
The equilibrium real  exchange rate  depends solely  on  real  variables,  called 
fundamentals, which vary over time meaning that the equilibrium real exchange rate 
itself varies over time. The actual real exchange rate, by contrast, depends on both the 
fundamentals and monetary variables. The real exchange rate thus deviates from its 
equilibrium due to the monetary variables and transitory changes in the fundamentals.
The equilibrium  real  exchange rate is  not  observable.  To estimate it  several 
approaches have been  suggested in  the  literature6. Though simple,  the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) approach –  which predicts that the long term real exchange rate 
equals one (absolute PPP) or is mean-reversing (relative PPP) – lacks statistical fit and 
ignore the role of fundamentals.
Another group of  approaches builds on the internal-external equilibrium. The 
behavioural  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  (BEER)  defines  the  equilibrium  real 
exchange  rate  as  the  level  of  the  real  exchange  rate  which  is  determined  by 
fundamentals such as the terms of trade, net external financial flows, etc. Equilibrium is 
not  imposed  subjectively but  is  instead derived  from  econometric  estimation.  A 
shortcoming is that the BEER is not always used in a general equilibrium framework 
(Soto and Elbadawi, 2008). In the fundamental equilibrium real exchange rate (FEER) 
approach,  the desirable and sustainable capital  account  balance is posited and the 
associated real exchange rate is taken as the equilibrium rate. In addition to being a 
subjective measure, the FEER is sensitive to hysteresis effects (Driver and Westaway, 
2004) and it  allows no role for either the fundamentals or  the adjustment dynamics 
(Soto  and  Elbadawi,  2008).  The  third  approach,  the natural  real  exchange  rate 
(NATREX) introduces the rate of time preference and productivity as fundamentals. In 
the long run, the current account is balanced, net foreign assets and the capital stock 
remain constant and the expected real exchange rate change is nil.
Finally, purely statistical approaches such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter allow a 
time  varying  long  run  real  exchange  rate  but  they  are  not  theory-based  and  may 
produce misleading results.
6 Excellent reviews of these approaches were conducted by Driver and Westaway (2004), Isard (2007) and Hinkle and Montiel (1999).
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Next, the paper turns to the estimation of the equilibrium real exchange rate.
2.2. Estimation of the equilibrium real exchange rate
The relationship between the  real  exchange rate  and its  real  and monetary 
determinants is estimated in a first  step. The equilibrium real exchange rate is then 
computed using the estimated coefficients associated with the fundamentals7.
2.2.1. The econometric model
Empirical studies of the equilibrium real exchange rate rely more and more on 
panel  cointegration techniques which – under some conditions – help deal  with the 
short times series depth of typical macroeconomic series and improve the estimation 
accuracy and robustness. Examples include Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005), Goldfajn and 
Valdes (1999), Calderon (2002), Ricci, Milesi-Ferretti and Lee (2008).
While consensus still remains elusive, a number of variables are widely used as 
fundamentals  in  the  empirical  literature.  They include  the  terms  of  trade  (logTOT), 
productivity growth (PROD), net external financial flows (FF), government consumption 
(logGC)  and  openness  to  trade  (logTrade).  We  also  include monetary  variables 
measuring monetary policy (MP) and devaluation (Deval) in  the regressions because 
their exclusion may result in spurious results  if they affect the real exchange rate and 
some of its fundamentals in the short run. The econometric equation is given by :
logRERit = αi + γt +β1i logTOT it +β2i PRODit +β3i FF it +β4ilogGC it +β5ilogTrade +
θ1i MP it +θ2i Deval it + εit
(1)
αi and γt are country and time specific effects respectively. ε is a random disturbance 
term. β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, θ1 and θ2 are parameters to be estimated whose expected signs 
are discussed below along with the measurement of the variables.
● The dependent variable
A consumer price index based effective real  exchange rate8 is  used for four 
reasons.  First,  the notion of  equilibrium real  exchange rate rests  partly  on external 
equilibrium which is necessary evaluated vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Second, the 
effective real exchange rate indicates a country's competitiveness relative to its major 
trade partners and competitors. Third, a bilateral real exchange rate does not always 
correctly describe the evolution of  the real  exchange rate calculated vis-a-vis  trade 
partners (Chinn, 2005). Lastly, labour unit costs face the availability hurdle, especially in 
developing countries (Hinkle and Montiel, 1999).
7 A similar approach was used by Edwards (1988), Baffes, Elbadawi and O'Connell (1997), Calderon (2002), and Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005).
8 This measure is widely used in the literature (see Edwards and Savastano, 1999).
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The effective real exchange rate is calculated as:
RER =∏
i=1
10
(
E p
Ed
∗
CPI d
CPI p
)
ω i
,
with ∑
i=1
10
ωi = 1
Ep and Ed stand for the partner and domestic countries bilateral nominal exchange rate 
respectively, expressed as local currency units per US dollar.  CPId and  CPIp are the 
consumer price index (or the producer price index when the former is missing) in the 
domestic and foreign countries respectively. ωi measures the domestic country imports 
share9 of  trading partner  country  i over  the period 1980-1986.  An increase in  RER 
represents a real appreciation of the domestic currency.
The above measure has some  limitations. First, it  uses fixed weights so that 
changes in the set of major trading partners are not captured. Second, the weighting 
scheme excludes exports whose evolution may differ from imports. Third, competition 
on third countries' markets is not taken into account.
● Explanatory variables
The  impact  of  a  permanent  terms  of  trade  change  on  the  equilibrium  real  
exchange  rate  is  ambiguous  because  of  a  negative  income  effect  and  a  positive 
substitution effect. However, empirical studies suggest that the income effect dominates 
the substitution effect  so that  a durable terms of  trade improvement is  expected to 
appreciate the equilibrium real  exchange (see,  Calderon,  2002).  Terms of  trade are 
measured by export as capacity to import, in constant local currency.
The productivity growth variable captures the Balassa-Samuelson effect, thus 
its expected coefficient is positive as in Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005).  The tradable-
nontradable productivity growth differential does not perform statistically well (see Ricci, 
Milesi-Ferretti and Lee, 2008). Therefore, we use the rate of growth of output per unit of 
labour10 though this measure does not take into account the quality of labour.
When a country experiences a permanent rise in net financial inflows, demand 
for  the domestic currency increases, thus tending to appreciate the equilibrium real 
exchange rate (Razin and Collins,  1997).  In  this  paper,  external  financial  flows are 
measured  by  the  ratio  of  private  capital  flows  to  GDP in  middle  and  high  income 
countries.  These  countries  are  relatively  better  integrated  to  world  capital  markets, 
hence  private  capital  flows  play  an  important  role.  In  low income countries  where 
private  financial  flows  are  not  likely  play  a  major  role,  external  financial  flows  are 
measured by the sum of net income from abroad and aid, as a percentage of GDP.
9 Only the ten largest (non oil exporting) trading partners are considered.
10 Productivity  is  measured  by  output  per  capita in  Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Dominica,  Saint  Kitts  and  Nevis,  Saint  Vincent  and Grenadines,  
Seychelles and Vanuatu where labour data is missing.
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The  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  response  to  a  change  in  government 
consumption is ambiguous. An increase will induce a real appreciation if it falls mainly 
on nontraded goods and if the government's propensity to consume nontraded goods is 
larger than  that  of  the  private  sector  (Galstyan  and  Lane,  2008).  If  the  additional 
government consumption falls mainly on tradable goods or on imports, the equilibrium 
real exchange rate will depreciate. The empirical literature reveals that when statistically 
significant, a rise in government consumption leads to an equilibrium real exchange rate 
appreciation (see, Goldfajn and Valdes, 1999, and Ricci, Milesi-Ferretti and Lee, 2008). 
We thus expect this impact even though the opposite may occur.
An  increase in  trade  openness  stemming  from trade  liberalization  will  likely 
depreciate the equilibrium real exchange rate. Indeed, a tariffs cut shifts demand from 
nontradable  towards  importable  goods  and  production  from  importable  towards 
nontradable and exportable goods, thereby depreciating the equilibrium real exchange 
rate (Dufrenot and Yehoue, 2005). Trade openness is measured by the sum of exports 
and import as a ratio of GDP.
The nominal variables entering the regressions represent monetary policy (MP) 
and devaluation (Deval).  As regards the former,  an excess growth of  money supply 
relative to money demand raises demand for nontradable goods, appreciates the real 
exchange rate and exerts an overvaluation pressure. Monetary policy is measured by 
the excess growth of money stock (M2) over the previous year's GDP growth rate. The 
domestic credit growth rate (gCredit) will be used as a sensitivity check. Misalignment 
tends  to  dissipate over  time  but  the  self-correction  process  may  be  protracted.  A 
devaluation may speed the process, especially when it  is  supplemented with sound 
macroeconomic policies (Edwards, 1998). We measure devaluation by changes in the 
effective nominal exchange rate11 used to compute the real exchange rate.
Appendix  3 contains  the data  sources.  The study period is  1970-2003.  The 
sample is  divided into  three subsamples  of  low,  middle and high  income countries 
according to the World Bank classification in 2003 (see appendix 2).  Real exchange 
rate,  terms  of  trade,  private  financial  flows,  government  consumption  and  trade 
openness data are in logarithm. All ratios and growth rates are in percentage.
2.2.2. Estimation strategy
Nonstationary dynamic panel  estimators12 of  long run relationships are more 
efficient  than  time  series  estimators,  especially  in  datasets  with  limited  time  series 
dimension.  They include semi-parametric methods such as the fully modified ordinary 
least squares (FMOLS) of Pedroni (2000) and parametric methods such as the dynamic 
11 The effective nominal exchange rate appears suitable to our analysis because it describes the evolution of the domestic currency relative to the  
currencies  of  the  country's  largest  trade  partners.  Moreover,  even  if  the  official  bilateral  nominal  exchange  rate  remains  unchanged,  an  
appreciation of the domestic currency against currencies of competitor countries may signal a competitiveness loss.
12 Nonstationary dynamic panel techniques have been gaining increased popularity in empirical studies of the real exchange rate (see, e.g., Pedroni, 
2001; Soto and Elbadawi, 2008 and references therein).
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ordinary least squares (DOLS) of Kao and Chiang (2000) and Mark and Sul (2003).
This  paper  uses  a  panel  FMOLS  approach  which permits  heterogeneous 
cointegrating vectors and short run dynamics. Indeed, Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005) and 
Calderon (2002) found support for heterogeneous cointegrating vectors between the 
real  exchange rate and its  determinants. FMOLS also corrects  for  endogeneity and 
some basic form of cross sectional dependency and produces asymptotically unbiased 
estimators and nuisance parameter free standard normal distributions (Pedroni 2000). 
However,  its  small  sample  coefficients  and  t-statistics  are  biased  when  the  cross-
sectional dimension is larger than the time series dimension of the panel. For a given 
cross-sectional dimension, the bias falls as the time series dimension grows large. To 
reduce the small sample bias we divide our sample of countries into three subsamples 
of high, middle and low income countries13.
The panel FMOLS estimator comes with a between and a within variants called 
group mean panel FMOLS and pooled panel FMOLS respectively. In practice, Pedroni 
(2000) recommends using the group mean panel FMOLS estimator for three reasons. 
First, it allows a consistent test of the null of homogeneous cointegrating vector against 
the  alternative  of  heterogeneous  cointegrating  vectors.  Second,  when  the  true 
cointegrating vector is heterogeneous, it produces consistent point estimates. Third, it  
has  relatively  better  small  sample  properties  than  the  pooled  estimator.  Indeed, 
Pedroni's simulations reveal that the group mean FMOLS has very small biases which 
fall  as  the  time series  dimension  rises.  For  similar  cross-sectional  and  time  series 
dimensions, the size distortions of the tests remain quite small. On the other hand, the 
pooled FMOLS tests are relatively powerful. Their power reach 100 percent for thirty 
individuals and twenty years at least. Given that our samples of middle and low income 
countries fall in this setting, the tests power is expected to be relatively satisfactory. In 
the sample of high income countries, the number of countries is smaller than that of 
years per country, hence ensuing good properties to the estimator.
Before running the FMOLS regressions, we conduct panel unit root tests and 
subsequently carry out cointegration tests in our samples.
● Unit root tests
We test  for  unit  roots  using the tests of  Hadri  (2000) and Maddala and Wu 
(1999). Hadri's test has a null of stationarity whereas Maddala and Wu's test postulates 
nonstationarity as the null. The results of Hadri's (2000) test, displayed in table 1, reject 
the  stationarity  hypothesis  for  all  variables  in  all  samples,  whether  individual  linear 
trends or individual specific effects  and linear trends14 are added. Moreover, in  high 
income countries, terms of trade and government consumption variables are I(2).
13 Razin and Collins (1997) and Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005) follow a similar approach.
14 The results which are not reported here are available from the author upon request.
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Maddala and Wu's test results, reported in table 2,  do not always agree with 
those of Hadri's test. In low income countries, the null of nonstationarity is rejected for  
external financial flows, productivity growth monetary policy and devaluation. In middle 
and high income countries the null is rejected for productivity growth, monetary policy 
and devaluation. In the remaining analysis we will adopt Hadri's test results.
● Cointegration tests
Panel  cointegration tests  are more powerful  than those for  time series  data 
(McCoskey and Kao, 1999) and have normal asymptotic distributions. Pedroni's (1999) 
panel cointegration test, used in this paper, posits the absence of cointegration as null. 
It  allows for  heterogeneous short  run  dynamics  and cointegrating vectors.  The test 
provides four “between” statistics and three “within” statistics. The tests, especially the 
between variant, are less restrictive than Kao's (1999) tests which have an alternative 
hypothesis of homogeneous cointegrating vector.  They are, like  McCosky and Kao's 
(1999) cointegration test, free of nuisance parameters and robust to endogeneity.
Table 3 displays the test results. Monetary policy is measured by excess growth 
of money supply in model 1 and by domestic credit growth rate in model 2. The null of  
no cointegration is rejected in all samples at the 1% significance level, except for the 
panel-v statistics in high income countries which is only significant at the 5% level. The 
conclusion appears robust since it is accepted by the group-ρ statistics which is the 
most conservative statistics in small samples (Pedroni, 2004).
●  FMOLS results
In each sample, two regressions of equation 1 corresponding to model 1 and 
model 2 are run. For low income countries15 (N = 35, T variable), the results are:
logRER = 0.08 *logTOT - 0.05 *logGC - 043 *logTrade + 0.30 *PROD + 0.01*FF + 0.00 *Monet + 0.36 *Deval           (2)
          (6.31)   (-5.95)         (-11.86)    (3.41)           (4.17)            (9.73)               (9.70)
    
logRER = 0.09 *logTOT - 0.00 *logGC - 0.44 *logTrade + 0.34 *PROD + 0.01 *FF - 0.00 *gCredit + 0.35 *Deval       (3)   
         (7.03)   (-3.83)          (-12.05)    (3.65)           (3.24)            (6.22)                  (9.45) 
Ceteris  paribus,  the actual  and equilibrium real  exchange rates appreciate by 0.8% 
following a permanent 10% improvement of terms of trade. A rise of 10 units in external  
financial flows or productivity growth leads to a 0.1% and 3% appreciation respectively. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  10  percent  increase  in  trade  openness  or  in  government 
consumption depreciates the actual and equilibrium real exchange rates by 4.3% and 
0.5% respectively. As regards the nominal variables, monetary policy has virtually no 
impact  whereas  devaluation  contributes  to  a  real  depreciation.  Starting  with  a  real 
15 Sudan, Central African Republic and Guinea were excluded from the estimation because the t-statistics of their coefficients are excessively high.
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overvaluation, a 10% nominal devaluation leads to a correction of 3.6%.
For middle income countries (N = 45, T variable), the estimation gives:
logRER = 0.21 *logTOT + 0.04 *logGC - 0.72 *logTrade + 0.13 *PROD + 0.07 *logFF -  0.00 *Monet + 0.64 *Deval   (4)
         (9.93)   (-5.19)          (-25.59)    (-12.10)           (11.09)            (4.26)               (28.61)
logRER = 0.09 *logTOT + 0.07 *logGC - 0.49 *logTrade – 2.33 *PROD + 0.02 *logFF + 0.00 *gCredit + 0.55*Deval   (5) 
          (6.71)                 (1.73)          (-22.13)   (-14.41)           (6.68)              (-0.52)             (23.17) 
Both relations indicate that the actual and equilibrium real exchange rates appreciate 
when the terms of trade improve, government consumption rises, private capital inflows 
increase  or  productivity  growth  accelerates.  However,  when  monetary  policy  is 
measured by domestic credit growth, the coefficient of productivity becomes negative16. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of government consumption rises substantially but is 
only significant at 10%. An increased openness to trade depreciates both actual and 
equilibrium  real  exchange  rates.  Monetary  policy  does  not  directly  affect  the  real 
exchange rate whereas devaluation depreciates it.
The estimated relationships in the sample of high income countries (N = 24, T 
variable) can be written as:
logRER = -0.04 *ΔlogTOT + 0.80*ΔlogGC - 0.46*logTrade + 0.24*PROD + 0.03*logFF + 0.00*Monet + 0.81*Deval    (6) 
          (-0.16)      (10.78)               (-20.11)          (5.07)           (2.63)             (1.24)            (12.82)
logRER = -0.02*ΔlogTOT + 0.78*ΔlogGC - 0.55*logTrade + 0.30*PROD + 0.06*logFF + 0.00*gCredit + 0.89*Deval   (7)
          (0.71)       (10.94)            (-21.77)      (5.97)             (4.25)              (0.62)              (13.87)
According to equation 6, when government consumption, productivity growth, or private 
financial  inflows  increase  permanently  by  10%,  the  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate 
appreciates by 8%, 2.4% and 0.3% respectively. It depreciates but not significantly so 
following a terms of trade improvement. When trade openness rises durably by 10%, a 
significant appreciation of about 4.6% of the equilibrium real exchange rate occurs. As 
in  the  two  previous  groups  of  countries,  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  is  nil  and 
devaluation leads to an even larger real depreciation.
Next, we compute the equilibrium real exchange rate and derive misalignment.
2.3. Misalignment indicators
Since the fundamentals may display transitory fluctuations, the equilibrium real 
exchange rate (ERER) is computed using their long term values (with the superscript 
HP) obtained from a Hodrick-Prescott filter. Based on model 1, we have the following 
relationships for low, middle and high income countries respectively:
16 This result may suggest that directly productive and productivity-enhancing activities are substitute in middle income countries.
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ERERit = 0.08 *logTOTHP - 0.05 *logGCHP - 0.43 *logTradeHP + 0.30 *PRODHP + 0.01 *FFHP               (10)
ERERit = 0.21 *logTOTHP + 0.04 *logGCHP - 0.72 *logTradeHP + 0.13 *PRODHP + 0.07 *logFFHP         (11)
ERERit = 0.80 *ΔlogGCHP - 0.46 *logTradeHP + 0.24 *PRODHP + 0.03 *logFFHP                                      (12)
Misalignment (MISit) is calculated as the difference between the actual (RERit) 
and the equilibrium (ERERit) real exchange rates:
MIS it = logRERit − ERERit (13)
In  order  to  eliminate  individual  and time specific  effects,  we subtract  from  MISit its 
individual specific mean ( ̄MIS i. ) and its annual mean ( ̄MIS . t ), and add the overall 
sample mean ( M̄IS ) to get the final misalignment (MISit*):
MIS it
* = MIS it − ̄MIS i. − ̄MIS .t + M̄IS (14)
with ̄MIS i.= Σ
t=1
T i
MIS it , ̄MIS . t = Σ
i=1
N
MIS it and M̄IS = Σ
i=1
N
Σ
t=1
T i
MIS it
A graphical analysis of the computed misalignment is conducted later in the paper.
3. Econometric analysis of the misalignment-effects of the exchange rate system
We  offer  a  summary  of  previous  empirical  studies  before  laying  out  our 
methodology and discussing the estimation results.
3.1. Previous empirical evidence
Empirical studies of the exchange regime-misalignment linkages are still limited. 
Coudert  and  Coharde  (2008)  carried  out  mean  comparisons  tests  across  de  facto 
regimes17 in a sample of  emerging markets  and developing countries from 1974 to 
2004. They found a larger overvaluation in fixed systems and a larger undervaluation in 
flexible  regimes.  The  impact  of  fixed  regimes  persists  when  inflation  is  moderate. 
Undervaluation is statistically smaller in intermediate than in flexible regimes only with 
Reinhart and Rogoff's classification and in high inflation countries. Studying Middle East 
and North African manufacturing sector competitiveness over 1974-1999, Nabli, Keller 
and Veganzones (2004) uncovered that overvaluation cases totalled 88% of all fixed 
regime observations and 76% in more flexible regimes. Moreover, overvaluation larger 
than 25% was recorded in half of all fixed systems observations and in less than 30% in 
flexible regimes.
The exchange rate crisis literature sometimes links fixed regimes to persistent 
and growing overvaluation. In this vein, Kempa and Nelles (1999) model the probability 
of  the  1992-1993  speculative  attacks  in  the  European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism 
17 The authors used the databases of Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
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(ERM) as an increasing function of each member currency's overvaluation which, in 
turn, stems from cumulative positive inflation differentials with Germany and the fixed 
bands  for  bilateral  nominal  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  The  authors  show  that 
speculative attacks started in countries with the most overvalued real exchange rates 
(Spain, Portugal, Italy and the United Kingdom) before spreading to other countries.
Alberola, Lopez and Serven (2004) compute  the Argentine peso misalignment 
over 1991-2001 and find an initial decreasing undervaluation until 1997 followed by a 
rising overvaluation which culminated at more than 50% in 2001. They then evaluate 
the  impact  of  the  currency  board  and conclude  that  the  divergent  evolution  of  net 
foreign assets and productivity growth relative to the United States substantially fed the 
peso's overvaluation, except in 1993. After 1995, the inadequacy of the dollar as anchor 
currency significantly  contributed  to  the  overvaluation  of  the  peso,  particularly  from 
1997 when the dollar overvaluation fed the peso's. In a similar spirit,  Sazanami and 
Yoshimura (1999) identified the overvaluation of the yen relative to the US dollar from 
1995 on as the principal factor of a  sharply rising misalignment of the currencies of 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand vis-a-vis the yen. In Indonesia and Korea the 
real  exchange rate was undervalued relative to  the yen but  that  undervaluation fell 
steadily  and  sharply  over  the  period  preceding  the  1997-1998  crisis  though  both 
currencies remained well-aligned against the dollar.
The  aforementioned  studies  tend  to  corroborate  a  negative  impact  of  fixed 
systems  on  misalignment.  Nevertheless  they  have  some  limits.  Indeed,  computed 
misalignment indices generally fall  in value when the number of  fundamentals rises 
(see Coudert and Coharde, 2008). Moreover, Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) find that the 
probability of overvaluation always exceeds 65% in fixed systems. In contrast, it never  
exceeds  30%  in  flexible  regimes  and  is  always  smaller  than  7%  in  floats. 
Notwithstanding  these  differences,  they attribute  a  non  negligible  share  of  the 
appreciation to  permanent changes in fundamentals  thus meaning that  appreciation 
does not necessarily imply overvaluation. Coudert and Coharde (2002) reach a similar 
conclusion in a sample of five Central and Eastern European countries18.
Goldfajn and Valdes' (1999) results suggest that fundamentals alone do not fully 
explain the larger real appreciation in fixed regimes (also see Baldi and Mulder, 2004).  
But, even if there is a relationship between the exchange system and misalignment, its 
extent would be much smaller than what Coudert and Coharde (2008) found. To deal 
with this problem, we use a large set of determinants frequently used in the literature. 
Another potential weakness of Coudert and Coharde's study is that they carry out their 
estimations  in  a  single  sample  of  more  than  one  hundred  countries  of  different 
development  levels.  This  may be problematic  given  the  weak  performances  of  the 
FMOLS estimator in small samples with a cross-sectional dimension larger than the 
18 Abdih and Tsangarides (2006) find similar evidence in the CFA Franc zone countries for the year 2005.
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time  series  dimension.  In  addition,  Dufrenot  and  Yehoue  (2005)  find  that  common 
factors among real exchange rate determinants differ between middle and low income 
countries. Lastly, Goldfajn and Valdes's sample includes the Bretton Woods period and 
they do not explain overvaluation episodes and their duration and correction.
Another value added of our study is the estimation of the effects of deviations of  de 
facto regimes from de jure systems.
3.2. Econometric approach
This  subsection  presents  the  empirical  models,  outlines  the  estimation 
methodology and discusses the results.
3.2.1. Empirical models
3.2.1.1. Exchange rate systems and misalignment
To assess whether misalignment depends on the exchange rate system, the 
following equation is estimated:
MIS*it =β0 +α1 FIX it +α2 INTERM it +β1πit +β2 Δ̃logTOT it +β3 Δ̃ logTradeit +β4 Δ̃logGC it + εit (15)
The variable MIS*it is defined in section 2.3. α1 and α2 measure the misalignment-impact 
of  fixed  and intermediate  regimes respectively.  Ɛ is  a  zero-mean disturbance.  FIXit 
(INTERMit) is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the regime of country i  
during year t is fixed (intermediate) and zero otherwise19.
Fixed  regimes  are  expected  to  be  associated  with  a  larger  misalignment, 
especially  in  low  and  middle  income  countries  where  adjustment  mechanisms  are 
limited or strongly constrained. The misalignment-impact of intermediate regimes is not 
clear-cut because these regimes offer both a nominal exchange rate anchor and some 
nominal  exchange  rate  flexibility.  The  effect  would  likely  depend  on  the  level  of 
development. Indeed, rich countries have strong institutions and deep financial markets 
which enhance their adjustment ability and make floating regimes more appealing than 
intermediate ones. Middle income countries are relatively more integrated to the world 
economy and finance than low income countries but less than high income countries. 
Their institutions are also not as developed as in high income countries (Rogoff et al., 
2004, and Calvo, 2000). These factors make intermediate regimes relatively attractive 
(Frankel, 1999 and 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2003) in reducing misalignment. At the 
same time, fixed regimes may sometimes impose high costs in middle income countries 
by making them vulnerable  to  speculative attacks  or  by substantially  restricting the 
economy's  adjustment  (Obstfeld  and  Rogoff,  1995).  We therefore,  assume  that  in 
middle income countries misalignment is smaller (larger) in intermediate (fixed) systems 
19 Flexible exchange regimes are the excluded category.
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than in flexible regimes.
The explanatory variables in equation 15 also include temporary terms of trade 
shocks  ( Δ̃ logTOT it )  and,  deviations  of  trade  openness  ( Δ̃ logTrade it )  and 
government consumption ( Δ̃ logGC it ) from their long run levels. The expected effects 
of these three variables are similar to those of the terms of trade, trade openness and 
government consumption on the equilibrium real exchange rate. We also introduce the 
inflation rate – measured as deviation from the relevant sample yearly mean inflation – 
in  accordance  with  previous  evidence  that  the  exchange  system  may  affect 
misalignment  (and  its  correction)  differently  according  to  the  inflation  rate  (Sarno, 
Valente and Wohar, 2003, and Coudert and Coharde, 2008). Domestic inflation pushes 
nontradable goods price upwards hence tending to appreciate the real exchange rate. 
Likewise, high inflation – stemming form unsustainable policies – increases devaluation 
pressures which, in turn, feed inflation. High inflation makes it hard to defend the fixed 
exchange rate  because  it  results  in  real  overvaluation  (Edwards,  1989b).  Frequent 
devaluations will  ultimately move the fixed regime close to a flexible one thus making 
the real exchange rate behaviour similar in both regimes.
3.2.1.2. Distinction of overvaluation and undervaluation episodes
Equation 15 does not make it possible to know whether a given misalignment-
impact  of  the  exchange  system  results  from  different  probabilities  of  over  and 
undervaluation  episodes  across  alternative  regimes.  To  pursue  this  avenue,  we 
estimate the probability of overvaluation by replacing the misalignment variable (MIS*) 
with an overvaluation variable (OVER20) in equation 15:
OVER it = β0 + α1 Fixit + α2 INTERM it + β1πit + β2 Δ̃logTOT it + β3 Δ̃ logTradeit +
β4 Δ̃ logGC it + εit
(16)
with OVER =
1 if MIS it
* >0
0 if MIS it
* ≤0
According to our previous arguments, a higher  probability of  overvaluation is 
expected in fixed systems in all countries and in intermediate regimes in low and high 
income countries. In middle income countries, by contrast, the real exchange rate would 
tend to be relatively less overvalued in intermediate systems than in fixed and flexible 
ones. The overvaluation probability rises with inflation and a transitory increase in terms 
of trade or government consumption; It falls with a transitory rise in trade openness.
20 Episodes of over and undervaluation are symmetric by definition.
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3.2.1.3. Deviations between actual and announced exchange rate regimes
Does reneging on the announced regime affect misalignment? To answer this 
question we re-estimate equation 15 replacing the exchange rate regime variables with 
new dummy variables that capture deviations of de facto regimes from de jure ones:
MIS it
* = β0 + α1 FF it + α2 FN it + α3 NF it + β1πit + β2Δ̃ logTOT it + β3 Δ̃ logTradeit +
β4 Δ̃ logGC it + εit
(17)
FF takes the value 1 if the regime of country i is classified as fixed by both the IMF and 
Reinhart  and Rogoff  (hereafter  RR) during year t,  and 0 otherwise.  FN equals  1 if, 
during year t, country i declares a fixed regime but follows a de facto regime that is not 
fixed, and 0 otherwise. NF equals 1 if country i announces a regime that is not fixed but 
actually runs a fixed one during year t, and 0 otherwise. NN takes the value 1 if country 
i declares and runs a regime that is not fixed during year t, and 0 otherwise. NN is the 
excluded category so that the coefficients of  FF,  FN and NF measure their respective 
differential impact relative to NN.
We also assess whether deviations of  de facto regimes from de jure regimes 
induce differences in the likelihood of over and undervaluation episodes by estimating 
equation 16 using the three new regime variables:
OVER it = β0 + α1 FF it + α2 FN it + α3 NF it + β1πit + β2 Δ̃ logTOT it + β3 Δ̃ logTradeit +
β4 Δ̃ logGC it + εit
(18)
3.2.2. The estimation method, data and sources
All  regressions are run by ordinary least squares. Equations with dependent 
binary  variables  are  estimated  by  logit.  Official  regimes  are  taken  from  the  IMF's 
“Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions”.  De  facto 
regimes are drawn from Reinhart and Rogoff21 (2003). The sample covers the 1973-
1999 period. Appendix 2 contains more information about the variables and data.
3.2.3. Results and interpretation
Before proceeding further we graphically describe yearly average misalignment 
in fixed, intermediate and flexible exchange rate systems in each sample.
3.2.3.1. Descriptive analysis
Figure 1 displays yearly average misalignment across  de jure regimes in low 
income countries. From the end of the 1970s to the mid 1980s, misalignment was the 
largest  in  intermediate  regimes  and  the  smallest  in  fixed  ones.  Over  the  period, 
21 Observations labelled “dual missing” are excluded.
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misalignment  remained quite  stable  in  fixed  regimes whereas it  dropped in  flexible 
regimes and fell sharply in intermediate ones. After 1985, it became the largest in fixed 
systems and kept rising until the early 1990s. Countries with intermediate and flexible 
regimes  experienced  a  fall  in  misalignment  until  1987,  year  from  which the  trend 
reversed. Misalignments in those two regimes remained quite close and were always 
smaller than in fixed regimes. Afterwards, misalignment markedly rose in intermediate 
regimes and became the largest of all regimes.
Using RR's regimes, we obtain figure 2 which shows a succession of rising and falling 
misalignment  periods.  Misalignment  in  intermediate  and  flexible  regimes  moved 
together, albeit with some lags. The evolution of misalignment in de facto fixed regimes 
was the opposite of that of the other two regimes. Comparing all regimes, misalignment 
was the smallest in  de facto fixed systems until  the mid 1980s. Afterwards, it   rose 
substantially and remained the highest until 1993. From then on, it fell considerably and 
became the smallest from 1994 to 1998.
We have compared the CFA countries to other fixed regimes in figure 3 which reveals 
an upward trend, broken off in 1994 in the former by the 50 percent devaluation of the 
CFA franc against the French franc. From then on, the trend resumed even though 
misalignment  remained  smaller  than  in  other  de  jure and  de  facto fixed  regimes. 
Misalignment in non CFA de facto fixed regimes displays large fluctuations over time.
Misalignments  in  fixed,  intermediate  and  flexible  regimes  in  middle  income 
countries are displayed in figures 4 and 5. Misalignment remained relatively small over 
time,  with  a  persistent  undervaluation  in  de  jure intermediate  and  floating  regimes 
(figure 4). Misalignment was, most of the time, the smallest in intermediate systems and 
the largest in fixed ones. In the later, a slight overvaluation was generally observed.
The comparison of misalignment across de facto regimes, shown by figure 5, confirms 
the smaller levels of misalignment in middle income countries. The main difference with 
figure 4 is that misalignment was the smallest in flexible systems whose real exchange 
rate was overvalued most of the time. Moreover the real exchange rate was sometimes 
slightly overvalued sometimes weakly undervalued in intermediate regimes.
Average misalignment in high income countries is described in figures 6 and 7. 
Figure 6 reveals that misalignment tended to rise until the early 1980s. This movement 
continued in intermediate regimes until 1995. Misalignment subsequently fell until 1996 
in fixed regimes and until 1998 in intermediate and flexible ones. Before 1985, the real  
exchange  rate  was  the  most  undervalued  in  intermediate  regimes  and  the  most 
overvalued in fixed regimes. After 1989, intermediate regimes experienced the largest 
overvaluation and fixed regimes generally recorded the smallest undervaluation.
Using  de  facto regimes,  differences  in  the  evolution  of  misalignment  appear  much 
smaller  (figure 7).  Flexible  regimes  display  the  best  performances  whereas  fixed 
regimes often have the largest overvaluation.
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Firms conclusions cannot be drawn from the graphical analysis. So a formal 
econometric investigation is undertaken.
3.2.3.2. Exchange rate arrangements and misalignment
Table 4 (columns 1-4) shows the estimation results in low income countries. The 
first column indicates that misalignment is significantly larger in fixed and intermediate 
de jure regimes than in flexible ones. In economics terms, the misalignment-impact of 
the  exchange  regime  is  important.  In  fact,  having  a  fixed  regime  raises  average 
misalignment by about 5% per year and the adoption of an intermediate regime leads to 
misalignment that is 16% larger relative to floating systems. As a matter of fact, low 
income countries with intermediate regimes experience much larger misalignment than 
those with fixed regimes, but not statistically so according to the Wald test. It is also 
noticeable that both fixed regimes and floats perform better than intermediate regimes, 
and between the formers floats dominate fixes at the economic and statistical levels.
To assess whether the performances of fixed regimes in low income countries 
are dominated by the CFA countries, we separate out the latter (CFA) from other fixed 
regimes (de jure NonCFA). Column 2 of table 4 suggests that the relatively larger and 
significant  misalignment  in  fixed  regimes  stems  mostly  from  CFA countries  whose 
misalignment is 6% larger on average. Nevertheless, the Wald test fails to reject the 
equality  of  the  coefficients  of  CFA  and  other  fixed  countries  even  though  the 
simultaneous equality of both coefficients to zero is rejected at the 4% probability level.  
On the other hand, only the effect of the CFA regime is significant at usual statistical 
levels. The results thus suggest a larger misalignment in fixed regimes which is mostly 
attributable to the CFA regime.
Apart  from government  consumption shocks,  the remaining control  variables 
appear in columns 1 and 2 with statistically significant coefficients. Misalignment rises in 
response to transitory positive inflation and terms of trade shocks. The opposite occurs 
when trade openness temporarily rises. Government consumption has no significant 
impact.  Comparing  columns  1  and  2,  all  estimated  coefficients  display  satisfactory 
stability.
Columns 3 and 4 show the estimations of columns 1 and 2 respectively, using 
RR's regimes. A larger misalignment still shows up in fixed and intermediate systems, 
the former displaying better performances as with  de jure regimes. The impact of the 
CFA regime remains unchanged at about 6%. Nevertheless, some differences appear 
between the two classifications of regimes. Indeed, the impact of fixed and intermediate 
regimes falls, dropping sharply (at least 50%) for the latter. When no distinction is made 
between  CFA and  other  fixed  countries,  the  effect  of  fixed  regimes  is  no  longer 
significant. Once this distinction is made, fixed regimes outside the CFA zone still have 
no significant impact and the sign of the coefficient becomes negative. Another major 
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difference between the two sets of results is that fixed regimes have an effect that is  
statistically different from intermediate regimes. In addition, fixed regimes outside the 
CFA zone still have an impact whose magnitude is statistically different from that of the 
CFA regime. An explanation of the larger misalignment in CFA countries relative to other 
fixed countries may be that the CFA Franc parity was modified only once – in 1994 – 
since the 1950s. The real exchange rate hence adjusted through changes in inflation 
and incidentally in the French franc parity vis-a-vis other currencies22.
Also, whereas the magnitude of the effects of the CFA and other de jure fixed 
and intermediate regimes were not statistically different, the simultaneous equality of 
the three coefficients is rejected at the 3.8% level with RR's de facto regimes as the last 
line of table 4 shows. Moreover, the equality to zero of all  de facto or  de jure regime 
coefficients  is  rejected.  In  general,  the effects  of  the control  variables increase and 
government consumption remains insignificant. Globally, the stability of the coefficients 
estimated with RR's regimes slightly deteriorates when CFA countries are singled out.
The results for middle income countries are contained in table 5 (columns 1-4). 
In column 2, Gabon, the sole CFA country, is excluded. According to columns 1 and 2, 
de  jure fixed  systems  significantly  raise  misalignment  (about  6%).  Contrary  to  low 
income countries, de jure intermediate regimes significantly reduce misalignment (about 
5%)  in  middle  income  countries.  Globally,  the  exchange  rate  system  exerts  a 
differentiated  and  important  impact  because  fixed  and  intermediate  regimes  have 
statistically significant and different effects. Regarding the other right-hand variables, 
only openness to trade has a significant coefficient.
When  de  facto regimes  are  used  instead,  the  finding  about  fixed  systems 
remains unchanged. Even though misalignment is about 2.4% higher in intermediate 
regimes, the estimated coefficients lack statistical significance. The coefficient of terms 
of trade is always negative now. Finally, as in columns 1 and 2, transitory shocks to 
inflation and government consumption have no significant impact.
Tests of joint significance of the exchange regime variables successfully pass at 
the 1% level. As before, the magnitude of the impact of fixed regimes is statistically 
different from that of intermediate ones. So, table 5  confirms that the exchange rate 
system has a non trivial misalignment-impact in middle income countries.
In  high  income  countries,  nominal  exchange  rate  flexibility  offers  the  best 
misalignment-reduction capacity irrespective of the classification scheme used in table 
6 (columns 1-4). Columns 1 and 2 also show that misalignment is marginally smaller in 
de jure intermediate regimes (about 2.6%) than in de jure fixed ones (at least 3%). With 
RR's regimes (columns 3 and 4), the estimated effects rise but the difference between 
22 These are the countries used to compute the effective real exchange rate.
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the effects of fixed and intermediate systems is smaller than with  de jure regimes. In 
addition, the tests clearly indicate that the effects of fixed and intermediate regimes are 
of equal magnitude, whatever the classification of regimes.
The finding  for  high  income countries  can be explained by  an  overshooting  of  the 
nominal exchange rate following a rise in inflation in a context of high capital mobility.
As  regards  the  remaining  control  variables,  a  temporary  terms  of  trade 
improvement significantly raises misalignment whereas a transitory rise in government 
consumption significantly reduces it  though not  statistically so.  The exclusion of  the 
inflation variable in columns 2 and 4 does not substantially alter the results.
Taken together,  these results  highlight  a  non-neutrality of  the exchange rate 
system  in  high  income  countries.  They  also  suggest  that  flexible  arrangements 
dominate fixed and intermediate regimes at the statistical and economic levels.
In  summary,  a  larger  misalignment  is  found  in  fixed  regimes.  Intermediate 
regimes are associated with higher misalignment in low and high income countries. This 
low performance may, in part, be explained by a limited credibility of monetary policy in  
the first group. In the latter, exchange rate flexibility offers a better adjustment ability in 
addition  to  a  greater  monetary  policy  autonomy.  In  middle  income  countries, 
intermediate regimes – when their  impact is significant  – reduce misalignment.  This 
advantage may reflect the existence of balance sheet effects. It may also stem from 
these countries' intermediate level of financial and trade integration.
We now assess the exchange system impact on over and undervaluation episodes.
3.2.3.3. Exchange rate arrangements and episodes of over and undervaluation
The probability of overvaluation episodes is estimated in the three samples. The 
results for low income countries are given in table 4 (columns 5-8). All else equal, the 
probability  of  overvaluation is  about  0.45% higher  in  de jure fixed systems than in 
flexible ones (column 5). It is about 0.43% and 0.46% higher in the CFA countries and 
other  de jure fixed regimes (column 6) than in flexible regimes, respectively. All three 
effects display satisfactory statistical significance. Therefore the larger misalignment in 
de jure fixed systems may be explained by a higher (lower) probability of overvaluation 
(undervaluation) in these regimes. Though positive, the impact of de jure intermediate 
systems on the overvaluation probability is never significant. This result means that the 
significant difference of misalignment between intermediate and flexible regimes cannot 
be explained by more (less) frequent overvaluation (undervaluation)  episodes in the 
former vis-a-vis the latter. It may nonetheless stem from larger (smaller) magnitudes of 
overvaluation (undervaluation) in intermediate than in flexible regimes.
Finally, the additional tests carried out suggest that the exchange regime variables are 
collectively  different  from  zero.  But  the  tests  fail  to  accept  the  hypothesis  of  a 
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differentiated impact between fixed and intermediate systems, between CFA and non 
CFA fixed regimes, and across all regimes.
Using the  RR's classification (columns 7 and 8), the results also suggest that 
the larger misalignment in intermediate regimes is not the consequence of a higher 
(lower) probability of overvaluation (undervaluation) in these regimes. Taken together, 
the overvaluation impact of de facto fixed systems is not different from flexible regimes.
Distinguishing CFA countries from other  de facto fixed regimes reveals that in 
the latter overvaluation probability is 0.50% lower than in de facto flexible systems. But, 
it does not translate into statistically different average misalignments (see columns 1-4). 
Column 8 also indicates that the significant larger misalignment in the CFA countries 
may not be the result of statistically different over and undervaluation probabilities.
When de facto fixed regimes are merged into a unique category, the tests suggest the 
absence of  a  differentiated impact  of  fixed,  intermediate  and flexible  systems.  This 
result  is  coherent  with  the lack of  statistical  significance of  the individual  exchange 
regime variables in column 7.  On the other hand, separating out  CFA countries re-
establishes the non neutrality of the exchange regime in column 8. In addition, CFA 
countries  are  statistically  different  from  other  fixed  regimes  and  the  hypothesis  of 
equality of all exchange regimes coefficients is rejected with a probability of 2.5%.
The results  for  middle income countries  are shown in  table 5 (column 5-8). 
Overvaluation is 0.63% more probable in  de jure fixed systems than in flexible ones. 
Excluding Gabon in column 7, overvaluation probability in fixed regimes marginally rises 
to  0.68%.  As  a  consequence  the  larger  misalignment  evidenced  in  de  jure fixed 
systems comes from more frequent overvaluation episodes. The same interpretation 
applies  to  the  RR's  classification  (columns  7  and  8).  On the  other  hand,  it  is  not 
possible to attribute the smaller misalignment found in de jure intermediate regimes to 
less frequent overvaluation episodes. A probable explanation may be a combination of 
smaller sized overvaluation and larger sized undervaluation episodes in these regimes. 
By contrast, in intermediate de facto regimes, overvaluation episodes are more likely to 
happen (columns 7 and 8) though these regimes do not induce a misalignment that is 
statistically different from flexible regimes.
The tests displayed at the bottom of the table confirm that fixed, intermediate 
and flexible systems have a differentiated impact on overvaluation episodes whatever 
the  classification  used.  They  also  corroborate  the  finding of  statistically  different 
misalignment-effects of fixed and intermediate regimes in columns 1 to 4.
All in all, table 5 suggest that the larger misalignment in fixed regimes is due to more 
(less) frequent overvaluation (undervaluation) episodes. Such an interpretation does not 
apply to intermediate systems where differences in average misalignments may likely 
come from different magnitudes of over and undervaluation episodes.
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The  structure  of  the  results  of  high  income  countries,  displayed in  table  6 
(columns 5-8), allows an easier interpretation. As shown above, average misalignments 
are larger in  de jure and  de facto fixed and intermediate regimes. These differences 
stem from a higher probability of overvaluation relative to flexible regimes. According to 
column 5 for instance, overvaluation is 1.16% and 0.96% more likely to occur in  de 
facto fixed and intermediate regimes than in de facto flexible systems, respectively.
The  tests  at  the  end  of  the  table  confirm  again  the  non  neutrality  of  the 
exchange rate system. They also suggest that the impact of fixed and intermediate 
systems is quantitatively identical in high income countries.
In  the  previous  analysis,  we  have  sometimes  reached  different  conclusions 
about de jure and de facto regimes. We endeavour to uncover what these differences 
are due to by assessing the effects of deviations of actual from announced regimes.
3.2.3.4. Misalignment and deviations between de jure and de facto systems
Does announcing a given regime and actually implementing another one affect 
misalignment  in the same way as running the announced regime? This  question is 
investigated by estimating equation 17.
Table  7  (columns  1-2)  provides  evidence  that  low  income  countries  which 
announce a fixed regime – whether they deliver it or not – record a larger misalignment. 
Among these countries, those which actually run a more flexible system are the most  
affected, albeit  not statistically so. Misalignment is substantially smaller (about 16%) 
and strongly significant when a country runs a fixed regime that was not announced in 
the first place. The table also shows that, among countries that declare and run a fixed 
regime, misalignment is larger though not statistically significant in the CFA members. 
By  contrast,  the  other  fixed  countries  display  a  relatively  smaller  but  marginally 
significant misalignment. The hypothesis of an identical misalignment impact in these 
two groups is comfortably rejected with a probability of 1.5%. In sum, table  7 reveals 
that  among countries running  de facto fixed systems, those that  did  not  promise it 
perform better than those which did. Among the latter, countries outside the CFA zone 
recorded smaller  misalignment than those whose  de jure and  de facto regimes are 
flexible. Keeping their words does not provide the CFA countries with any misalignment 
advantage relative to countries with both de jure and de facto flexible regimes.
The “fear” of letting the nominal exchange rate fluctuate may be explained by 
the intention to reduce misalignment. Indeed, the additional tests carried out reveal that 
the impact of alternative exchange regimes is not identical. Once a country decides to 
fix its nominal exchange rate and announces it, actually keeping this promise or not 
does not induce any significant difference. Among countries which promise and deliver 
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a fixed regime, the misalignment of  CFA countries significantly exceeds that  of  non 
member  countries.  Moreover,  CFA countries  reap  no  advantage  by  fulfilling  their 
promise.  Indeed,  their  real  exchange  rate  is  on  average  more  misaligned  than  in 
countries that do not announce their de facto fixed regime.
Notice also that when a country has a fixed regime, not announcing it is relatively more 
beneficial.  Finally,  the  effects  of  the  different  de  facto fixed  systems  cannot  be 
considered identical as do the effects of different  de jure fixed regimes. Likewise, the 
exchange rate regime exerts a significant differentiated impact in these countries.
The distinction of over and undervaluation episodes is done in columns 3 and 4. 
It  appears  that,  when a  country  announces  a  fixed  regime,  its  real  exchange rate 
deviates  relatively  more  from  equilibrium.  In  column  3,  the  probability  of  an 
overvaluation is 0.32% higher in countries fulfilling their promise and 0.63% higher in 
those that  do not  than in countries that  promise and deliver  more flexible  regimes. 
Nevertheless this higher tendency to overvaluation does not translate into an average 
misalignment that is statistically different from that induced by exchange regimes that 
are not fixed both de jure and de facto (see column 1, table 7). The estimations do not 
reveal any significant tendency to overvaluation in countries with unannounced de facto 
fixed regimes. In column 4, the CFA countries are isolated. Their effect on over and 
undervaluation episodes is not distinguishable from that of  de jure fixed regimes that 
are also fixed  de facto.  This  is  consistent  with the results  of columns 1 and 2.  By 
contrast, the probability of overvaluation is smaller (about 0.44%) in non CFA countries 
with  a  de  facto fixed  regime.  This  significant  impact  indicates  that  the  smaller 
misalignment in non CFA countries with both de jure and de facto fixed regimes stems 
from less frequent overvaluation and more frequent undervaluation episodes.
In terms of magnitude, the tests robustly reject the hypothesis of non neutrality 
of the exchange rate regime.  De jure or  de facto fixed regimes are associated with 
misalignment effects that are collectively different from zero. Again, CFA countries are 
significantly different from non member countries with both de jure and de facto fixed 
regimes, the latter performing better. Furthermore, announcing or not a regime that is 
de facto fixed does not appear to affect the size of the estimated effects whether the 
country belongs or not to the CFA zone. Finally, non CFA countries which fulfil  their  
promise to fix their nominal  exchange rate are different from those which do not.
The results for  middle income countries, contained in table 8 (columns 1-2), 
clearly  show  that  countries  which  declare  a  fixed  regime  have  significantly  higher 
misalignment irrespective of whether they deliver it or not. But misalignment is larger (at 
least 8%) in countries that keep their promise. Countries that fix their exchange rate 
without pre-announcing it are characterized by larger misalignment (more than 8%), the 
size of which is close to that of countries with both de jure and de facto fixed regimes. In 
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fact, the size of the estimated coefficients is identical independently of the deviations 
between de jure and de facto regimes as shown by the tests in the bottom of the table. 
In addition, the non neutrality of the exchange rate system is again confirmed. The main 
feature of table 8 is that, in middle income countries, having a de jure or de facto fixed 
regime  substantially  raises  misalignment.  This  finding  corroborates  previous  results 
obtained in this sample.  The conclusion is also confirmed  by columns 3 and 4  which 
indicate a relatively higher probability of overvaluation in all fixed regimes, be they pre-
announced or not. Globally, the magnitudes of the coefficients of the exchange regime 
variables included in columns 3 and 4 are identical. As a matter of fact, independently of 
deviations of  promises from facts, pre-announcing a fixed regime or running one in fact 
appears costly because it makes overvaluation episodes more frequent so that average 
misalignment grows larger.
The results  for  high income countries are similar  to  those of  middle income 
countries. Indeed, columns 1 and 2 of table 9 reveals that, fixed regimes, whether pre-
announced or  not,  significantly raises misalignment but  the estimated effects are of 
substantial smaller sizes. As columns 3 and 4 show, the larger misalignment in fixed 
regimes is also the result of higher (lower) overvaluation (undervaluation) probabilities.
Conclusion
The  paper  has  assessed  the  misalignment-effects  of  de  jure and  de  facto 
exchange systems and those of deviations of actual regimes from announced ones in 
low, middle and high income countries.
Misalignment is found to be larger in fixed regimes than in flexible ones in all 
countries, with both de jure and de facto classifications. The most pronounced impact is 
observed in middle income and the CFA countries. In the former, the lower performance 
of  fixed  regimes  may  be  explained  by  the  usual  case  against  fixed  systems. 
Furthermore,  the  relatively  higher  trade  and  financial  integration  of  these  countries 
would  tend  to  amplify  the  costs  of  nominal  exchange  rate  fixity  especially  during 
financial  crises  or  distress.  The  empirical  results  also  suggest  that  the  larger 
misalignment in fixed regimes stems from more frequent overvaluation episodes. These 
findings  are  consistent  with  the  association  of  fixed  systems  to  more  frequent 
overvaluation  episodes  evidenced  by  Goldfajn  and  Valdes  (1999).  However,  this 
interpretation does not hold robustly in low income countries with the RR's regimes.
Intermediate regimes are also associated with a larger misalignment in low and 
high income countries. In middle income countries, by contrast, misalignment is smaller 
in intermediate regimes than in both fixed and flexible systems. Furthermore, only in 
high income countries does this impact come from a higher probability of overvaluation 
episodes. In low and middle income countries, overvaluation and undervaluation with 
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different magnitudes may be a plausible explanation.
The better  performance of  intermediate regimes in middle income countries can be 
rationalized  by  Bordo's  (2004)  finding  that  corner  regimes  do  not  suit  emerging 
countries. Indeed, hard pegs may eliminate exchange rate crises but only by banking 
crises more likely due to the lack of a lender of last resort. Moreover, the “original sin” 
leads to maturity and currency mismatches in financial assets and liabilities which make 
devaluation very costly. Floating will have no real effect if indexation is widespread or if 
the  country  has  a  history  of  profligate  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  Intermediate 
regimes  thus  remain  a  viable  option  for  emerging  countries  which  are  increasingly 
integrated to global finance but still lack fully developed domestic financial markets.
Finally, the analysis reveals that low income countries with a fixed regime may 
benefit from not pre-announcing it. In doing so they may get a larger leeway when the 
economy is hit by adverse shocks because the nominal exchange rate may vary without 
such a change signalling any break of commitment.  This finding may explained the 
observation  by  Levy-Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger  (2005)  of  an  increasing  tendency  of 
countries running de facto fixed systems to not commit to fixing their nominal exchange 
rate. On the other hand, in middle and high income countries, reneging on the promise 
to fix the exchange rate appears costly. And our results suggest that, in these countries, 
the “fear of floating” phenomenon documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) cannot be 
justified by misalignment considerations.
Larger  misalignments  may  entail  substantial  economic  costs.  Therefore, 
countries which adopt fixed and intermediate regimes (except middle income countries) 
should enhance their economy's flexibility. This objective may be achieved through the 
development of sound and well regulated financial markets, stronger institutions, more 
flexible labour and goods markets, sound macroeconomic policies and regional  and 
international monetary cooperation. But, as stressed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), no 
substitute exists for the real exchange rate adjustment though it may be facilitated and 
its costs attenuated. As a matter of fact, whatever regime a country runs, enhancing the 
flexibility of the economy should always remain a medium and long run objective in 
order to facilitate adjustment to changing domestic and external economic conditions.
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Appendix 2: List of countries
Low income countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso,Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,  
Indonesia, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo,  
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe,  Sudan, Guinea.
Middle income countries: Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt,  
Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iran, Jordan, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Paraguay, El Salvador, Suriname,  
Swaziland, Seychelles, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Venezuela, Vanuatu, South Africa.
High income countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait,  
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, United States.
CFA franc zone countries: The exchange parity of the CFA franc is fixed at 1 euro for 655,955 CFA franc. The CFA franc zone is composed of two groups of countries. The west African bloc 
includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Guinea-Bissau has joined the CFA zone on may 2nd, 1997. Mali exit the zone on July 1962 and re-
integrated it on June 1st, 1984. The central African group includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Equatorial Guinea has joined 
the zone on august 27, 1984. Madagascar and Mauritania exit the zone in 1973.
Appendix 3: Data
Variable Definition Source
Real exchange rate (logRER) See text CERDI
Devaluation (Deval) See text Idem
Terms of trade (logTOT)          (Log) exports as capacity to import, constant local currency. WDI 2003 and 2005
External financial flows (FF)    (Log) gross private capital flows as % of GDP in middle and high income countries. In low income countries, ratio of the sum of 
net income from abroad (in current US dollars) and aid (in current US dollars) to GDP (in current US dollars), in %.
Idem
Productivity growth (PROD)  Growth rate (in %) of constant US dollars GDP per labour unit. The data of economically active population is taken from the 
series “labor force, total”.
Idem
Trade openness (logTrade)     (Log) ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP, in %. Idem
Government consumption  (logGC) (Log) Government consumption spending as % of GDP. Idem
Monetary policy (MP) Model 1: Excess growth rate of money stock (M1) in current local currency over the previous year's growth rate of  current local 
currency GDP, in %.
Idem
Model 2: Growth rate of domestic credit provided by the banking sector over GDP, in % Idem
Inflation (π) Deviation of the inflation rate from its sample yearly average. Idem
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Table 1: Results of Hadri's unit root test
Variables Low income countries (N = 38) Middle income countries (N = 45) High income countries (N = 24)
P-value of Z-stat P-value of Het Z-stat P-value of Z-stat P-value of Het Z-stat P-value of Z-stat P-value of Het Z-stat
LogRER
First difference of LogRER
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.82
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.91
0 .00
0.74
0.00
0.57
LogTOT
First difference of LogTOT
Second difference of LogTOT
0.00
0.59
0.00
0.20
0.00
0.56
0.00
0.48
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
LogTrade
First difference of LogTrade
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.98
0.00
0.99
0.00
0.99
0.00
0.95
0.00
0.98
PROD
First difference of PROD
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
LogGC
First difference of logGC
Second difference of LogGC
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.99
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.97
0.00
0.77
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
FF
First difference of FF
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.99
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
Monet
First difference of Monet
0.97
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.73
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.16
1.00
0.00
1.00
gcredit
First difference of gcredit
0.97
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.40
1.00
0.01
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
Deval
First difference of Deval
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
Note: Z-stat and Het Z-stat are the Hadri's test statistics; the latter is robust to heteroskedasticity. Individual fixed effects are included.
The null is the stationary hypothesis.
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Table 2: Results of Maddala and Wu's unit root test
Variables Low income countries (N = 38) Middle income countries (N = 45) High income countries  (N = 24)
P-value of Fisher Chi-2 P-value of Fisher Chi-2 P-value of Fisher Chi-2
LogRER
First difference of LogRER
0.98
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00 0.38
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00 0.00 0.93
0.00
LotTOT
First difference of LotTOT
0.00 0.00 1.00
0.00
0.81
0.00
0.00 1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.27
0.00
1.00
0.00
LogTrade
First difference of LogTrade
0.00 0.00 1.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00 1.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00 1.00
0.00
PROD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LogGC
First difference of LogGC
0.00
0.00
0.00 0.97
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.06 1.00
0.00
FF
First difference of FF
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00 0.95
0.00
0.41
0.00
0.00 1.00
0.00
Monet 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gcredit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Deval 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The null is non stationarity. In the first sub-column, individual fixed effects are added; in the second one, individual fixed effects and individual linear trends are 
included; the third sub-column includes no individual fixed effects or individual linear trends.
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Table 3 : Results of Pedroni's cointegration tests
Test statistics
Low income countries
(N = 38)
Middle income countries
(N = 45)
High income countries
(N = 24)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
panel v-stat
panel rho-stat 
panel pp-stat
panel adf-stat
group rho-stat
group pp-stat 
group adf-stat
-12.96
15.51
21.72
30.13
8.57
3.00
4.84
-12.96
16.15
31.16
26.39
8.44
3.13
4.49
-14.10
13.94
-2.72
15.84
10.74
3.68
5.34
-14.10
17.48
25.61
29.23
11.08
4.58
5.24
-2.42
6.03
3.35
4.89
7.81
4.48
5.51
-2.49
6.11
3.39
5.15
7.83
4.28
5.55
Note: The critical values of the test statistics are 2.57 at 1%, 1.96 at 5% and 1.64 at 10%. 
The null hypothesis is the absence of cointegration.
In model 1, monetary policy is measured by the excess growth of the money stock (M1) over the previous 
year's GDP growth rate. In model 2, it is measured by the growth rate of the domestic credit provided by the  
banking sector.
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Table 4: Misalignment and overvaluation regressions, low income countries
Dependent variable in regressions 1 to 4 : Misalignment Dependent variable in regressions 5 to 8 : Overvaluation
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
de jure Fix 4.94** 0.45**
(1.98) (2.56)
de jure Interm 16.03* 15.99* 0.35 0.35
(1.82) (1.82) (0.76) (0.76)
inflation 41.05** 42.44** 49.73*** 53.45*** 0.6 0.57 0.61 0.69
(2.50) (2.53) (2.67) (2.75) (1.13) (1.04) (0.94) (0.99)
 logTOT 32.25** 32.29** 41.57** 40.95** 0.99* 0.99* 1.44** 1.40**
(2.39) (2.39) (2.52) (2.51) (1.80) (1.80) (2.25) (2.19)
 logTrade -91.31*** -91.41*** -105.08*** -104.93*** -2.79*** -2.79*** -3.29*** -3.29***
(-3.57) (-3.57) (-3.50) (-3.52) (-3.50) (-3.50) (-3.63) (-3.63)
 logGC 1.72 1.61 6.98 6.05 -0.2 -0.2 0.11 0.01
(0.15) (0.14) (0.53) (0.46) (-0.27) (-0.27) (0.14) (0.016)
CFA 6.01** 5.94* 0.43** 0.14
(2.27) (1.88) (2.10) (0.60)
de jure NonCFA 4.14 0.46**
(1.55) (2.43)
de facto Fix 3.77 0.14
(1.35) (0.71)
de facto Interm 7.789*** 8.00** 0.26 0.16
(2.71) (2.53) (1.16) (0.66)
de facto NonCFA -1.79 -0.50*
(-0.42) (-1.91)
Observations 842 842 704 704 842 842 704 704
Number of countries 35 35 29 29
Overall R2 / Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Within R2 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
Between R2 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.23
Wald chi2
Prob > chi2
39.37
0.00
39.35
0.00
28.04
0.00
29.37
0.00
23.90
0.00
23.94
0.00
19.28
0.00
25.30
0.00
All regimes = 0
Fix = Interm
CFA = NonCFA
All regimes equal
6.92
[0.03]
1.51
[0.22]
8.27
[0.04]
1.00
[0.32]
2.49
[0.29]
8.01
[0.02]
3.48
[0.06]
10.15
[0.02]
4.29
[0.04]
6.52
[0.04]
6.57
[0.04]
0.04
[0.84]
6.62
[0.08]
0.04
[0.83]
0.09
[0.96]
1.35
[0.51]
0.37
[0.54]
7.39
[0.06]
6.46
[0.01]
7.37
[0.02]
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses; p-values in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions contain a constant and time dummies for the 1980 and 
1990 decades.
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Table 5: Misalignment and overvaluation regressions, middle income countries
Dependent variable in regressions 1 to 4 : Misalignment Dependent variable in regressions 5 to 8 : Overvaluation
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
de jure Fix 5.66** 6.36*** 0.63*** 0.68***
(2.54) (2.84) (3.84) (4.05)
de jure Interm -5.12** -4.91* -0.22 -0.2
(-1.97) (-1.90) (-0.80) (-0.75)
inflation -5.82 -4.74 -4.46 -3.5 -0.65 -0.58 0.04 0.09
(-0.70) (-0.57) (-0.54) (-0.42) (-1.35) (-1.21) (0.073) (0.17)
 logTOT -1.09 1.39 -7.1 -5.39 0.11 0.42 -0.46 -0.22
(-0.11) (0.13) (-0.63) (-0.46) (0.12) (0.43) (-0.48) (-0.22)
 logTrade -54.39*** -54.89*** -49.41** -49.31** -4.12*** -4.33*** -3.38*** -3.53***
(-2.97) (-2.97) (-2.51) (-2.47) (-3.57) (-3.67) (-2.85) (-2.91)
 logGC 9.28 12.46 11.69 15.35 -0.47 -0.19 -0.01 0.31
(0.85) (1.15) (0.97) (1.27) (-0.48) (-0.19) 0.01 (0.30)
de facto Fix 6.61** 7.25** 0.90*** 0.92***
(2.23) (2.46) (3.69) (3.76)
de facto Interm 2.41 2.46 0.39* 0.39*
(0.86) (0.88) (1.81) (1.79)
Observations 917 895 849 827 917 895 849 827
Number of countries 45 44 40 39
Overall R2 / Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Within R2 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10
Between R2 0.01 0 0.06 0.04
Wald chi2 74.01 74.38 61.37 63.63 71.97 71.04 63.91 60.95
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All regimes = 0
Fix = Interm
12.83
[0.00]
12.35
[0.00]
14.35
[0.00]
13.48
[0.00]
9.22
[0.01]
7.45
[0.01]
11.95
[0.00]
9.89
[0.00]
18.89
[0.00]
9.74
[0.00]
20.61
[0]
10.44
[0.00]
15.25
[0.00]
8.58
[0.00]
15.76
[0.00]
9.19
[0.00]
Note: see table 4.
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Table 6: Misalignment and overvaluation regressions, high income countries
Dependent variable in regressions 1 to 4 : Misalignment Dependent variable in regressions 5 to 8 : Overvaluation
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
de jure Fix 3.07*** 3.25*** 1.04*** 1.06***
(3.74) (3.92) (4.36) (4.48)
de jure Interm 2.59*** 2.42*** 0.79*** 0.74***
(3.67) (3.35) (3.47) (3.30)
inflation -37.20*** -44.09*** -8.51** -10.16***
(-2.74) (-3.28) (-2.54) (-3.12)
 logTOT 21.51* 23.84* 22.85** 25.36** 3.53 3.92 3.74 4.3
(1.86) (1.95) (1.99) (2.06) (1.30) (1.39) (1.33) (1.48)
 logTrade -66.25*** -64.84*** -66.72*** -64.90*** -17.82*** -17.03*** -17.81*** -16.94***
(-6.87) (-6.68) (-6.98) (-6.67) (-5.89) (-5.74) (-5.88) (-5.65)
 logGC 1.41 2.59 0.2 2.06 -0.99 -0.63 -1.21 -0.7
(0.066) (0.12) (0.0096) (0.096) (-0.23) (-0.14) (-0.28) (-0.16)
de facto Fix 3.95*** 3.96*** 1.16*** 1.14***
(4.61) (4.64) (4.37) (4.39)
de facto Interm 3.89*** 3.43*** 0.95*** 0.84***
(5.24) (4.58) (4.46) (4.02)
Observations 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553
Number of countries 23 23 23 23
Overall R2 / Pseudo R2 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10
Within R2 0.18 0.15 0.2 0.17
Between R2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05
Wald chi2 84.79 79.97 115.27 95.24 56.22 55.25 63.29 54.58
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All regimes = 0
Fix = Interm
18.35
[0.00]
0.39
[0.53]
18.29
[0.00]
1.07
[0.30]
33.50
[0.00]
0.01
[0.94]
28.50
[0]
0.44
[0.51]
23.83
[0]
0.83
[0.36]
24.28
[0]
1.41
[0.23]
26.77
[0]
0.66
[0.42]
24.53
[0]
1.45
[0.23]
Note: See table 4.
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Table 7: Misalignment, overvaluation and deviations of de facto from de jure regimes, low income countries
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
FF 1.57 0.32
(0.55) (1.63)
FN 3.51 1.5 0.63*** 0.36*
(1.04) (0.53) (2.78) (1.68)
NF -15.53*** -15.97*** -0.66 -0.79
(-3.89) (-3.95) (-0.88) (-1.05)
inflation 45.49** 48.28*** 0.59 0.61
(2.50) (2.60) (0.97) (0.96)
 logTOT 41.79** 40.95** 1.51** 1.42**
(2.55) (2.52) (2.31) (2.20)
 logTrade -107.14*** -106.65*** -3.36*** -3.31***
(-3.60) (-3.60) (-3.63) (-3.61)
 logGC 4.7 3.1 0.13 -0.02
(0.35) (0.24) (0.17) (-0.021)
CFA 2.5 0.17
(1.01) (0.87)
NonCFANonCFA -6.46 -0.45
(-1.58) (-1.64)
Observations 700 700 700 700
Number of countries 29 29
Overall R2 / Pseudo R2 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.03
Within R2 0.17 0.17
Between R2 0.11 0.18
Wald chi2 30.50 34.80 26.76 29.00
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All regimes = 0
FF = FN
FF = NF
CFA = NonCFANonCFA
CFA = FN
NonCFA NonCFA = FN
All de jure Fix equal
CFA = NF
NonCFANonCFA=NF
All de facto Fix equal
All regimes equal
19.05
[0.00]
0.60
[0.44]
15.57
[0.00]
17.78
[0.00]
23.30
[0.00]
5.96
[0.01]
0.15
[0.70]
3.78
[0.06]
5.97
[0.05]
17.74
[0.00]
3.10
[0.08]
21.74
[0.00]
22.62
[0.00]
9.14
[0.03]
2.28
[0.13]
1.71
[0.19]
4.40
[0.11]
11.52
[0.02]
5.57
[0.02]
0.65
[0.42]
8.58
[0.00]
9.00
[0.01]
1.62
[0.20]
0.19
[0.66]
6.79
[0.03]
10.70
[0.01]
   Note: See table 4. The dependent variable is Misalignment in regressions 1 and 2. The dependent 
   variable is Overvaluation in regressions 3 and 4.
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Table 8: Misalignment, overvaluation and deviations of de facto from
              de jure regimes, middle income countries
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
FF 8.18*** 9.21*** 0.81*** 0.87***
(3.78) (4.30) (4.11) (4.26)
FN 6.28** 6.78** 0.49** 0.52***
(2.05) (2.21) (2.57) (2.72)
NF 8.43** 8.32** 1.24*** 1.23***
(1.98) (1.96) (2.70) (2.68)
inflation -3.85 -2.6 -0.22 -0.13
(-0.47) (-0.32) (-0.44) (-0.28)
 logTOT -3.2 -0.79 0.08 0.39
(-0.28) (-0.067) (0.081) (0.38)
 logTrade -52.12*** -52.48*** -3.65*** -3.85***
(-2.67) (-2.65) (-3.06) (-3.16)
 logGC 10.74 14.34 -0.05 0.26
(0.90) (1.21) (-0.046) -0.25
Observations 841 819 841 819
Number of countries 40 39
Overall R2 / Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07
Within R2 0.12 0.13
Between R2 0.06 0.03
Wald chi2 81.97 87.15 76.36 74.37
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All regimes = 0
FF = FN
FF = NF
All regimes equal
16.27
[0.00]
0.74
[0.39]
0.00
[0.95]
0.75
[0.69]
20.75
[0.00]
1.24
[0.27]
0.04
[0.84]
1.27
[0.53]
21.46
[0.00]
2.47
[0.12]
0.85
[0.36]
4.02
[0.13]
22.80
[0.00]
2.72
[0.10]
0.60
[0.44]
4.02
[0.13]
   Note: See table 4. The dependent variable is Misalignment in regressions 1 and 
   2. The dependent variable is Overvaluation in regressions 3 and 4.
Table 9: Misalignment, overvaluation and deviations of de facto from
               de jure, high income countries
COEFFICIENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
FF 2.37* 2.51** 0.66* 0.69**
(1.88) (1.99) (1.90) (1.99)
FN 2.61*** 2.91*** 1.02*** 1.08***
(2.89) (3.16) (3.96) (4.12)
NF 2.18*** 2.55*** 0.93*** 0.98***
(3.21) (3.93) (3.16) (3.39)
inflation -32.60** -6.71**
(-2.43) (-2.03)
 logTOT 22.29* 24.31** 3.74 4.1
(1.91) (1.99) (1.35) (1.44)
 logTrade -66.88*** -65.66*** -18.03*** -17.42***
(-6.87) (-6.73) (-5.99) (-5.90)
 logGC 2.42 3.33 -0.72 -0.42
(0.11) (0.15) (-0.17) (-0.095)
Observations 553 553 553 553
Number of countries 23 23
Overall R2 / Pseudo R2 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10
Within R2 0.16 0.13
Between R2 0.21 0.24
Wald chi2 88.19 85.97 60.57 61.26
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All regimes = 0
FF = FN
FF = NF
All regimes equal
16.13
[0.00]
0.03
[0.87]
0.02
[0.88]
0.19
[0.91]
21.53
[0.00]
0.07
[0.79]
0.00
[0.98]
0.14
[0.93]
23.77
[0.00]
0.86
[0.35]
0.39
[0.53
0.87
[0.65]
26.41
[0.00]
1.01
[0.31]
0.51
[0.48]
1.04
[0.59]
    Note: See table 4. The dependent variable is Misalignment in regressions 1 
    and 2. The dependent variable is Overvaluation in regressions 3 and 4.
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